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The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial 
Matching 
In mid-December, as one of the outgoing Bush Administration’s last 
minute regulations, the Department of Justice radically expanded the category 
of persons from whom federal officials are now required to collect DNA. The 
rule requires federal officials to collect and retain DNA not only from persons 
convicted of a federal offense, but also from those merely arrested on suspicion 
of being involved in a federal offense.1 Among its other flaws, this rule 
exacerbates the tension between the shared nature of genetic information and 
the standards justifying DNA collection and retention. By linking DNA 
collection to probable cause, the new regulation threatens to destabilize our 
understandings about what constitutes probable cause and to put millions of 
never-arrested individuals under perpetual genetic suspicion. 
The Department of Justice justified the rule by pointing to the significant 
crime-detection and crime-prevention gains that expansion of the Combined 
DNA Index System (CODIS) will yield. CODIS includes genetic information 
collected by all fifty states, as well as by federal law enforcement, and its genetic 
profiles are available to any state that wishes to access it for crime-detection 
purposes.2 
The government also explained its rule through extended analogy to other 
biometric information collected at the time of arrest, namely fingerprints. The 
rule calls the thirteen “core loci” that make up a CODIS profile a “genetic 
 
1.  DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73   
Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,932 (Dec. 10, 2008) (directing federal agencies to “collect DNA samples 
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-United States 
persons who are detained under the authority of the United States,” subject to certain 
limitations and exceptions). The focus of this article is on federal arrestees. 
2.  Id. (noting that all fifty states participate in CODIS). 
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fingerprint[],”3 describes the “practical uses” of DNA profiles as “similar in 
general character to those of actual fingerprints,”4 and refers to the 
acceptability of collecting fingerprints at the time of arrest in responding to 
comments critical of the expansion of DNA collection to arrestees.5 The rule 
further states, “the quantum of information sufficient to warrant an arrest—
probable cause that the individual has committed a crime—is deemed a 
sufficient basis for the collection of certain biometric information, including 
DNA.”6 
The analogy to fingerprints, however, is deceptive. CODIS takes advantage 
of minute genetic differences to build profiles that may pinpoint a specific 
individual whose genetic information is stored in its database.7 But the 
individual from whom genetic material is taken is not the only person who may 
be identified using a particular CODIS profile. Rather, because close genetic 
relatives have similar “genetic motifs,”8 a partial match between a crime scene 
sample and a stored genetic profile may also implicate family members. A 
“partial” or “familial” match refers to two complete genetic profiles—one 
derived from a crime scene sample and the other from CODIS—that share 
some, but not all, of the thirteen core DNA loci.9 
A partial match excludes the individual with whom the match is made 
because that individual’s DNA clearly differs from the crime scene sample at 
one or more of the CODIS loci. Such a match, however, may inculpate close 
genetic relatives not otherwise in the relevant database who, like the crime 
scene sample, share some but not all of the examined loci with the individual 
whose CODIS profile provided the partial match. The information derived 
from a partial match where two nonmatching profiles share rare genetic 
markers will be particularly suggestive of a relative’s involvement in a crime.10 
 
3.  Id. at 74,933. 
4.  Id. 
5.  See, e.g., id. at 74,937 (analogizing “DNA identification information” to fingerprints, as well 
as photographs of arrestees, in responding to comments on the scope of sample collection); 
id. (referring to “genetic fingerprints” in responding to comments on privacy); id. at 74,941 
(“[C]ollecting DNA samples from federal arrestees on the same footing as fingerprints is the 
approach most conducive to public safety and is not overly broad.”). 
6.  Id. at 74,939. 
7.  Id. at 74,933 (explaining that a genetic profile in CODIS “can be used to identify an 
individual uniquely”). 
8.  Thomas M. Reid et al., Use of Sibling Pairs To Determine the Familial Searching Efficiency of 
Forensic Databases, 2 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 340, 340 (2008). 
9.  For present purposes, I exclude matches that occur where a crime scene sample yields an 
incomplete genetic profile, such that no match may be more than “partial.” 
10.  Marjan Sjerps & Ate D. Kloosterman, On the Consequences of DNA Profile Mismatches for Close 
Relatives of an Excluded Suspect, 112 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 176, 176 (1999). 
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Thus, even where a particular individual has been excluded as the perpetrator 
of a crime, a partial match may indicate that a close family relative of the 
individual whose profile provided the match was involved in the offense under 
investigation.11 
Partial matching of this kind is currently in use in several states.12 In April 
2008, California adopted the “most aggressive approach in the nation” to 
partial matching, regularizing the practice in its pursuit of information in 
criminal investigations.13 As participants in CODIS, California and other states 
not only contribute genetic profiles to the national genetics database, but also 
have the ability to use it in their own law enforcement efforts.14 
California’s partial matching policy, and the use of partial matching by 
other states, is inconsistent with a key tenet of the Executive’s new rule. The 
rule explicitly identifies probable cause as the appropriate level of suspicion 
that must exist for the collection and use of an individual’s genetic information 
for database purposes.15 Probable cause is an exacting standard, in most 
instances requiring at least individualized suspicion.16 Before entering an 
individual’s DNA into CODIS, the government must have probable cause to 
believe that that individual committed a crime. This question may be 
independent of whether the government has probable cause to investigate a 
person for the particular crime for which it is using partial matching. Under 
either inquiry, however, no probable cause can be said to exist for a previously 
arrested individual’s close relatives prior to the discovery of a partial match.17 
 
11.  See Reid et al., supra note 8, at 340; Sjerps & Kloosterman, supra note 10, at 176. 
12.  See Memorandum from Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Att’y Gen. of Cal., to Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr., Att’y Gen. of Cal., DNA Data Bank Program: Reporting “Partial Matches” to 
Law Enforcement 2 (June 6, 2007). In July 2006, the FBI reversed longstanding policy to 
permit states to disclose to other states the identity of database offenders who may not be 
the perpetrator, but who represent a partial match to a crime scene DNA sample. Id. 
13.  Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, State Offers Police Extra DNA Tool, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at 
A1. See generally Memorandum from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att’y Gen. of Cal. to All Cal. 
Law Enforcement Agencies and Dist. Att’ys Offices, DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA 
Profile to Offender) Policy (Apr. 25, 2008). 
14.  At present, California’s partial matching policy involves only its own state database of 
genetic profiles. Dolan & Felch, supra note 13. 
15.  73 Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,939. 
16.  See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 & 
n.18 (1968). 
17.  It is by no means clear, of course, that a partial DNA match represents anything close to 
probable cause for arrest either. 
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Nevertheless, partial match data has been used to request DNA from relatives 
of individuals with profiles in the CODIS database.18 
Indeed, while a partial match search may return hits for individuals whose 
DNA profiles were encoded in the database pursuant to probable cause, those 
individuals are explicitly not the targets of such a search. This is especially clear 
where an exact match search has failed to yield a match. Rather, partial 
matching methods are designed to yield information about individuals not in 
the applicable database—individuals for whom no probable cause has yet 
existed with respect to any crime. 
Moreover, partial matching methods presently have a substantial rate of 
false positives—supposed relatives who, upon analysis, turn out not to be 
related.19 Thus close genetic relatives of federal arrestees will become subject to 
unnecessary investigations when partial matching incorrectly suggests that the 
perpetrator is related to an individual whose DNA profile is stored in CODIS. 
The government has thus far ignored the incompatibility and interrelation 
between the Executive’s probable cause standard and partial match searching. 
Indeed, in responding to comments regarding partial matching submitted in 
reaction to this rule when initially proposed, the Department of Justice stated: 
“[T]he concern raised by these commentators [does not] have any obvious 
relationship to the matters addressed in the rule.”20 On one level, the 
Department of Justice is correct: partial matching is problematic whether the 
profiles to which it is applied come only from convicts or also from arrestees. 
As explained above, however, partial matching is inconsistent with present 
formulations of probable cause, the standard emphasized in justifying the 
collection and use of genetic information from federal arrestees. The 
Executive’s new rule thus puts a finer point on the mismatch between search 
standards and the expanding use of partial matching in criminal investigation. 
Ignoring the connection between these two issues and permitting them to 
proceed apace threatens to radically expand what “probable cause” means. 
Partial matching can create a causal loop, whereby the existence of a partial 
match may create the suspicion that was necessary to justify the search in the 
first place. Courts have, at least nominally, rejected this kind of circular logic.21 
 
18.  See Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, a Tool To Make Arrests, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 
2008, at A1. 
19.  See, e.g., Reid et al., supra note 8, at 342. 
20.  73 Fed. Reg. at 74,938. 
21.  See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“Whether probable cause exists 
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting 
officer at the time of the arrest.”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“It is axiomatic that hindsight may not be employed in determining whether a 
prior arrest or search was made upon probable cause.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The move from presearch suspicion to nonindividualized probabilities is 
therefore not inconsequential. Such a move should not be accomplished 
through inattention and without opportunity for public discussion and 
contestation. 
If the Executive is serious about establishing probable cause as the relevant 
baseline for the collection and use of genetic information for law enforcement 
purposes—and, with its extensive analogies to fingerprinting, this seems 
likely—then it ought to ensure that partial match searching is not conducted 
using the samples it enters into CODIS. A prohibition on such searching 
should necessarily include not only searches by federal law enforcement 
officials, but by state officials as well.22 The costs of moving in the other 
direction—abandoning any probable cause standard for genetic searching in 
order to preserve the potential usefulness of partial matching methods—are too 
great. 
 
Natalie Ram is a recent graduate of Yale Law School and a law clerk for the 
Honorable Guido Calabresi. 
 
Preferred citation: Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and 
Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 182 (2009), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2009/04/13/ram.html. 
 
22.  Prohibiting partial match searches may substantially impact state practices in genetic 
identification. A full exploration of the interrelationship between federalism and genetic 
identification, however, will have to await another day. 
